LCA policy implementation, and using Sabatier's Policy Implementation Framework (PIF) on the effectiveness of external control.

This blog entry regards the questions:

1. LCAs are a tool for assessing the environmental impact of products. Think up four ways in which government can increase the use of LCAs through external control and setting boundary conditions. 

2. Use Sabatier’s framework to assess the potential effectiveness of external control vis-a-vis other options.

1. 

First of all it is fruitful to analyse the meaning of the concepts called 'external control' and 'boundary conditions'. 

External control and setting boundary conditions are in my opinion interlinked concepts that as a result encompass the basic structure that is commonly used by governments to reach a goal that is set to be reached, or to get a policy implemented. External control and setting boundary conditions can be seen as separate methods for the implementation of policies, but I want to assume and argue that both the concepts are dependent on each other and perpetuate each other.

What does this mean?

Think about this example: A municipality can place thresholds on the roads, by this the municipality nudges drivers to drive slowly. Nudging is therefore an invisible source of control that is used by the government to shape and control the way in which actors act [1]. 
The control of the conditions that are defined by the government can be monitored in various external ways, such as making (use of) laws, the police and other forms of legitimate power. 

The question will then be: 'how does an actor, which is regarded as an actor that needs to fulfil the goal of the government, be accompanied by the government to make everything possible? This can be described as setting boundary conditions. The government can make various media available to accompany actors to act toward the decided goal. Media such as taxing, subsidies, education, et cetera. This all should lead to self-organization of actors, which means that actors organise themselves within the conditions that are set. I interpret this process of internalising the conditions by actors as 'waiting of the government for a time in which the goal of the government is reached because of the fact that routines evolve in processes that are performed by actors'. Routines that cover the boundary conditions that are set. Till that time external control can be used too, as mentioned earlier, to get a policy or goal implemented, for example by monitoring and sanctioning.

So it can be said that to 'administrate', which is regulating and enforcing the process of reaching the goal (ie. policy implementation), the process of getting LCAs used, the government has to come up with a basic structure that makes this possible. To make it possible depends in my opinion on the interlinked connection between setting boundary conditions, which are conditions in which actors can act according to the new goal of the government, and the external control, which actually controls, monitors and sanctions the actors who are not acting as desired.

The four ways in which government can increase the use of LCAs through external control and setting boundary conditions are, in my opinion:

1. Enforcing a policy by another policy.

The government can come up with a policy that is enforced by another policy - policy that enables the necessary use of LCA - for example the "2030 rule of the transport sector" [2]. This actually entails the method of legitimising a policy by using another policy that is initiated by the same actor, in this case the government. The policy that the government comes up with can force firms to use LCAs for environmental impact analysis, for example by asking the CO2-footprint of products. In the sense that the use of the LCAs will become a rule, because of the implementation of the new policy. A feedback loop can be inscribed in the form of control and penalties. 

Why?

I think that this is one method that can be used by the government to nudge people to act according to the policy that is planned to be implemented. The actors are forced to act according to the new conditions that are set. The feedback loop can be seen as the monitoring of the process, the external control.
It is also possible to do this on a more international scope, for example by using EU-policies such as the "20-20-20-rule". By this, certain policies regarding the use of LCAs can be underlined. 

2. Competition for marks of image. 

Another possibility is to involve a competitive aspect to doing business, in such a way that companies comply themselves to the use of LCA. The government can come up with certain national labels or marks that show the amount of ecological transparency of a product. This can nudge companies to use LCA to analyse products and redesign them according to the national marks on products, such as the mark 'Max Havelaar/ Fairtrade kleding'[1].

Why?

I assume that every company wants a good image. So, if you can come up with a certain mark or label, then you can attract companies to use LCA to analyse their product on the value of the mark and let them redesign it according to the rules that are made by the government. I think that this 2nd method will lead to a higher form of self-organization than the first method. The marks are not only a boundary condition or medium through actors are nudged, but also something to strive for because of the green image that can be gained. The mark will therefore be something that will stand on his own and strived for by the companies. The need for external control is therefore far less then controlling actors on the use of LCAs because of the desire of the government. In short: the 2nd method involves an extrinsic motivational aspect. The external control can be done by monitoring the distribution of the marks.

3. Subsidising the use of LCA.

Thirdly, the government can make subsidies possible for companies that use the LCA method for environmental impact analysis. By doing this, the government can motivate firms to act according to the goals of the government if we assume that monetary value is a motivational factor. This is a way of setting boundary condition that makes the use of LCAs more desirable. The external control will take place at the financial department of the government where the subsidise are requested from.

Why?

I think that this method is something that will extrinsically motivate people to act according to the rule that is given by the government. This will therefore lead to more self-organisation and willingness to act according to the desired goal of LCA use of the government.

4. Education on the use of LCA.

The last method that can be used to motivate firms to use LCAs is by promoting, educating and advertising about LCA as the best format for doing research, and the one that is counted as the primary research tool in country X. This can be done at platforms that are created by the government. 
If people know more about the LCA method, and get acquainted with it by demonstrations and other educative methods, then firms may tend to use it. This method makes the possibility of self-organization more approachable.

Why?

I think that this is a fruitful method to use, because of the fact that the government does not set big borders or penalties. It just looks like the external control factor is neglected. The question then will be about the effectiveness of this method. Educating and showing the (financial) possibilities of the use of LCAs looks to be a good boundary condition to motivate actors to the use of LCAs, moreover when the government stated that LCAs are the main research tool. I agree on the critiques about the lack of external control and monitoring that takes place in this method. My argument will be that this fourth method can be used as perpetuation of other methods for motivating actors to use LCAs. By saying this, I am not arguing that this method has no value. It surely motivated and organises actors towards using the LCAs, but there is no form or even a need for controlling this process.

So, these four ways of motivating actors to use the LCA method for environmental impact assessment can be seen as a way that form the basis for the administration of the policy implementation.

2. 

It is possible to argue that assuming that external control as a method for forcing or nudging actors to act as desired may not be that effective because of the lack of universal behaviour of actors. Other forms of regulation may also be possible. Sabatier uses his framework called Policy Implementation Framework (PIF) to analyse the aspects or fields of research that are necessary part of new policy implementations. His framework is shown in the figure below:

Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983). Implementation and Public Policy.

Sabatiers Framework.

There are several rules that are written by Sabatier that all are linked to the process of administration of policy implementation. In this entry, I want to analyse the effectiveness of external control and the effectiveness of setting boundary conditions by using Sabatiers framework.

Difference External control and Setting boundary conditions in 'Tractability of the problem'.

If we look at the first section, named as 'tractability of the problem', we can see that lines 2 & 4 can form a problem for external control. These lines acquire enough data to have a broad vision on how to cope with different behaviour of actors. External control needs a vision of how to handle with this in monitoring and sanctioning. Setting boundary conditions is a total different way of looking at those lines. It actually acquires more a way of nudging and encompassing the actors instead of coming up with one solution that fits all.


Difference External control and Setting boundary conditions in 'Ability of Statute to Structure Implementation'.

The main difference between external control and setting boundary conditions will occur in this section. This section requires the external control mechanism to come up with new departments that monitor and sanction actors that are not willing to act according to the desired plans of the government. So you need officials and agencies that are formally implementing the plans. I think that this way of monitoring and sanctioning will take a lot of time. Besides this, an unambiguous directive (line 2) is something that is hard to achieve. It basically means that there is a complex plan which is concise and accord the different actors. If all of this works, then external control is the most steady and effective way of implementing a policy. But it takes time and effort.

Setting boundary conditions doesn't deal with this problem. It only needs agencies that can be seen as accompanying agencies who help and inform actors about the use of LCAs and what the financial benefits are. It has a much more horizontal power relation instead of the top-down hierarchical power relation. 

I think that this shows the difference between external control and setting boundary conditions clearly. 

Difference External control and Setting boundary conditions in 'Non-Statutory Variables Affection Implementation'.

I think that setting boundary conditions more agrees with this section then external control, but the problem with setting boundary conditions is in my opinion the fact that you need to rely on the willingness of the actors. There is only a relation of trust and reciprocity which makes everything doubtful. The external control method can make use of a good promotion channel of media, but there is need of actors that are not hesitated to comply. If the plans are not made clear and positive for the actors, then external control may be inhibited.

As a conclusion I would like to state that both the concepts have pros and cons. They can be listed as:

External control:

Pros:

- Effectiveness.

Cons:

- The financial costs
- Resistance 
- Takes more time to achieve because of different behaviour of actors.

Setting boundary conditions:

Pros:

- Horizontal power relations which looks like a bottom-up approach

Cons:

- Willingness, trust and reciprocity are needed. These are not things that necessarily emerge, it all depends on very broad factors, from political believes in a country to esteem of actors.


[1] van Oenen, G. (2011). Nu even niet. Over de interpassieve samenleving. Amsterdam: Van Gennep

[2] http://www.milieucentraal.nl/keurmerken/inhoud/kleding/kleding/max-havelaar-fairtrade-kleding

[1

http://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vhesf063wxu9/europese_aanpak_klimaatverandering

http://www.pbl.nl/publicaties/eu-doelen-klimaat-en-energie-2030-impact-op-nederland

• Sabatier, P. A. & Mazmanian, D. A. (1983). Can Regulation Work? The Implementation of the 1972 California Coastal Initiative. xi + 389 pp. New York, London: Plenum Press. 

Feedback page - due to 31st of December 2014

Blog# 14- I think that the case is well explained and written.
– Your three explanations are really fruitful. However, are there any numbers that underline your theses? I understand that cultural and normative values nudge people to do certain things, but to what extend does this work? I realise that this blog is not a scientific paper, however, I would be interested in quantitative data.
– What is the scope of your analysis? (a,b)
a. Are the constraints universally applicable?
b. Is the specific mindset that you are elaborating on applicable to all cultures in the world? Or is this only a western mindset?
– I think your first argument is interesting. I would like to know what you mean by ‘the lack extensive knowledge base of women’ . What kind of ‘knowledge’ is this? Is this only the knowledge that is gained by education, or is it a combination between knowledge that is gained by education and knowledge that can be described as ‘experiences’? I think that this is in interesting topic to talk about. If it not only about knowledge that is gained true education, then the differences between men and women may also become gradual instead of radical.
Blog# 14
I think that you are reflecting well on the statement and that you are shining different lights on the problem. Using these references makes your argument very strong.
One remark will be about the scope of your argument and the scope of this statement. Do you think that the relations that you mention are worldwide applicable?
Blog#15
I think that you made a good distinction between the two position; well done!
– I think that you did good by using examples. This makes your arguments more vivid and testable/ quantitative.
– I also liked that you developed your own position at the end of your blog.
– Do you think that the materials that you have found on the internet are specific enough for this topic? The questions wasn’t to find as much as you can, I know, but I am asking you this because it may be interesting to develop more positions.


Blog#15Well explained again. I think that you make good distinctions.
– I liked your example on the F16’s. It makes your blog easier to understand.
– However, I think the blog should get more into detail about the two positions, regarding the example. It now looks like a summary about the bounded rationality and rational decision making and shedding a light on the F16’s. Getting more into detail about the claims that the government makes about joining the war against ISIS might make your blog more fruitful.


Blog#15- I like your puzzle and the way you start your reasoning.
– I think that your arguments are correct and that you are explaining them well. However, are there any numbers that underline your thoughts and are in line with the diagram?
– You might explain the greenhouse effect a little bit before giving arguments. I think that readers who are not familiar with the dynamics of CO2 may not understand your arguments wholly.
– You might consider quantative data to make your arguments stronger. It can be interpreted as unconvincing arguments.


Blog#15 I think that you have thought in a good way.
– However, you are prescribing what a business should be like. Do you think that this is the question?
– Can you explain more things that should be the business of business? By taking the prescriptive path, you can state more then just saying that the business of business is to maintain a healthy society. Don’t you think?


Blog#16None available

Blog#17None available

Blog#18Hi Bob,
the example that you use is very clear. I like your topic.
– You give a clear conclusion, which is good to see. You do not only conclude your research, but also show what the intension is of Ostrom’s framework. I liked that.
– You may however go deeper into the boundaries that you assume. Resource systems regarding the use of water may be different in different parts of the world. What do you think about this?
– Another question that I have is about the statements that you make, for example regarding the motivation of the government, et cetera. For the sake of your argument, it would be better if there are link to articles or quotations.


Blog#19Dear Hans Peter,
I liked your writing and the way you order and arrange your blog. I think it is well done! Because of this I don’t have a lot of things to mention. You already covered your arguments.
There are however a few things that I would like to ask you.
– You take a cultural relativism approach in your argumentation about the differences between the west and the east; this connotes in your writing. Do you think it is interesting if you go deeper into the discussion, for example by looking more at the pros and cons for Nokia to invest in a globalised production chain?
– Secondly, what do you think that ‘enforcement’ of the supplier should look like? Do you mean by specific protocols or just by excluding them for example?
– I liked your distinction between ‘window dressing’ and the ‘actual problem’. You could think about extending it a bit with examples.
I look forward to read more blogs of you!
Kinds,
Ozkan Larcin


Blog#20Dear Marie-Louise,
I very much liked the way you describe the various concepts. I think this is very fruitful and needed in order to understand the topic. You use good examples and it was very clear to me.
However, there are a two things that I want to mention.
– First of all, I don’t think that you are answering the questions for this week’s assignment. But I may be wrong. I mention this because I only see that you are writing about legitimacy but are not getting into detail about the relation between Nokia and the Chinese supplier.
– Secondly, I would like to see an extension of the ‘rules’ that you regard to in your conclusion and that you like to enforce and also what this enforcement looks like. Do you mean certain ISO regulations? I am sure this is only a matter of re-writing, but I think it is for the sake of your argument.
I enjoyed reading your blog!
Kinds,
Ozkan Larcin


Blog#21Dear Kim,
I liked your argumentation and you give a clear and sound view of the situation in the documentary. You are also well describing the dependencies between the companies, and thereby the relation that those companies have. However, there are two things that I want to share with you, and that you may take into account.
1. You describe that both the companies are equally dependent on each other. Do you think this is correct? In my view there are more suppliers in the world than that there are multinational companies such as Nokia(,Samsung, Apple, et cetera). Which in my opinion makes Nokia less dependent and thereby forces the supplier to change it’s business ethos.
2. I very much liked your move to the conglomeration of companies from which a more centralised and universal way of business occurs. I was also thinking about the ISO 14000 norms. Don’t you think that this is also something that can be seen as an universal tool for control?
Kinds,
Ozkan Larcin


Blog#22Dear Zejun,
I liked your blog entry and I think that you are thinking holistically about this problem.
However, there is something that I want to ask you about your solutions in general:
The thing that I want to mention raise when I was reading your first argument. You are stating that
“Natural selection favors the force of psychological denial [1]. Education is needed to counteract the natural tendency to do the wrong things which lead to collapse of our resource system.”
What do you exactly mean by this? How can education change the ‘natural’ thing called psychological denial. Isn’t it paradoxical to think that education will change the ‘natural’ interest of people to do wrong, into doing right? In other words: How can something ‘natural’ be neglected and turned into something artificial?
If it is correct that people are doing wrong by themselves, then the only thing that can be used as a mechanism to counter this will be something like you mention in the second argument, so something such as ‘external control’, or motivating people to do right.
This is something that I would suggest to think about.
Kinds,
Ozkan Larcin
Blog #24
Dear Michael,I liked your use of Hardins Tragedy of the Commons. There are however a few things that I would like to remark:Preliminarily:What do you exactly mean by the sentence: 'the problem was not the student, but the rules of the game'? Do you mean that the problems only occurred by the rules of the game? In my opinion, the problem is not totally because of the rules of the game. There were teams that did manage to be sustainable. How come? I think because of their willingness to be sustainable and not competitive. What do you think about this argument?About your arguments:- I like your solution of giving permits. My question will be: Is there a feedback mechanism that makes the overall situation controllable and transparant?- What will be the positive outcome of the possibility of negotiation for keeping the fish in the sea balanced? In other words: what does this additional (communicative) rule mean for the task of keeping the fish in the sea balanced in the time-span that is defined? I can't make the link between communication and the behaviour of the players in the game.Kinds,
Ozkan Larcin

Blog #25
Dear Sayra,
I enjoyed reading your blog entry. It gives a nice overview and analysis of the Kalundborg eco-industrial park. I have no remarks, only something that you can take into considerations if you want to take another perspective.
I was thinking about the concept of ‘Institutional capacity’ in which trust, communication, knowledge sharing and transparency between the firms (actors) are the dominant factors for managing the industrial symbiosis. It is said that the factors in this concept were the necessary things in current eco-industrial parks such as Kalundborg. So you might take a look at this concept. In short it means that the firms in Kalundborg and other eco-industrial parks are transparant, share their knowledge and trust each other. If they are not, then the symbiosis will not occur.
You can take a look at this article, it explains the concept very well: “Boons, F. and Spekkink, W. (2012), Levels of Institutional Capacity and Actor Expectations about Industrial Symbiosis. Journal of Industrial Ecology, 16: 61–69″
Kinds,
Ozkan Larcin

Blog #26

Dear Nicole,

well done by looking broadly at the discussion about the tragedy of the commons. I think you did well! 

However I would like to know what your real, practical solutions and measurements are for the harvest game in class. I see that you are mentioning the pros and cons of several options, but not the stating the best solution for implementing. 

Secondly, for the sake of the argument: how can trust between companies emerge? Should this be provided by external parties?

Blog # 27

Dear Francesca,your solution looks nice and creative. It may work actually!However, my critical thoughts are: - is there any control at the port that eliminates the possibility of illegal fishing or fishing by my other group members, just at the other part of the sea? I am stating this because the delegation may go out for fishing, which is a sustainable solution, but this does not mean that it is impossible for me as a (illegal) fisher to go out and fish? - what kind of game do you think of for competing for the remaining fish?Nice work!

Blog #28
Dear Diana,

I liked your way of thinking and it is good that you clearly explained the concept of ecoindustrial development.

However I have one questions regarding your plan:


- What do you know about the internal scope of this plan? Economic crisis is not something that takes place universally. So how can your plan be valued by, for example, quick economically developing countries as Turkey.

Blog #29

Dear Daniel,

you thought up some good rules for making the use of LCAs more common. However I think that there is room for thought. I wrote the same blog and bumped into a few question. You might have thought of them. I couldn't find it in your blog entry.

My thoughts are:

- What is the difference between external control and setting boundary conditions if it comes to monitoring the actual use of LCAs. Are there any feedback mechanisms in setting boundary conditions that are not externally controlled?

- Sabatier uses his PIF framework for implementing a policy. Don't you think it is hard for the external control method to come up with a feasible plan that covers all of the different behaviour in society.

It is something to think about

Nice Silvester!

Blog #30

Dear Branco,

very nice and detailed description of your  ideas about the implementation of LCAs. I loved to read it. However I have one major remark that regards the idea of altering market conditions.

You already mention it that companies may all together may refuse the use of LCA. How can you, as a government, tackle this possible problem? 

The Harvest game - new rules for managing the amount of fishing.

This blog entry is on the Harvest game that is performed in the last SSPM lecture. In short, the Harvest game is about the sustainable harvest of fish. 

The lecturer made a few groups of the students who were in class. After the division, the assignment for the groups was to select an annual amount of fish that they wanted to harvest. The teacher kept record of the amount of fish and communicated each round - which was a fictive currency for 'year' - about the amount of fish that was in stock at the beginning of each year. The last description of the assignment was that there is no possibility of communication between the groups. 

Why this game?

The game is actually a way of showing that competition and rivalry is the dominant force in this game. And that lack of external control or communication between the parties makes situation chaotic. All students want to be sustainable, but at the end a few groups disordered the balance which was kept till the 3rd year/ round. Till that round three of the five teams kept a constant amount of fish that they wanted to harvest. By this amount, every group should have get the same amount of fish. However, the class did not succeed in neglecting the rivalry which seems to be inherent human.

New functions! New rounds?!

The lecturer decided to add a functionality to the game. The game will become:

"We now allow for communication among teams [this is the ONLY change in the set up!]. Think up a set of additional rules for the game that effectively ensures that teams collectively do not exceed the sustainable yield. Within the context of the game, teams may create new entities (a policing force, a common meeting, etc.); you CANNOT assume something like a government already exist; if you need it, the teams will have to create it by themselves"

Additional rules.

In my opinion the best thing to do first is to decide what the core of the problem is. As I described earlier, I think the core of the problem is the tension between 'rivalry to be the  fisher with the most fishes' and 'neglecting this and being sustainable'. So in reality this means that managing this tension will reflect in the amount of fish that is harvested by each group. Therefore I want to add two additional rules to the current situation.

First rule:

If it is possible to communicate, then I want to argue that the amount of fishing should be decided and controlled by a, to be formed, centralised institution - a form of externally monitoring and sanctioning (controlling) that decides what the regulations, limitations and amounts are. This institution will be controlled by a selection of the members of the groups that were consistent/ sustainable in the amount of fish that they wanted to harvest each year. I think that these groups are using a sustainable economic model.
In the next section I will elaborate on this underlying sustainable economic model and the model that is in my opinion used by the other groups. 

Before moving on, I want to make say that deciding for the groups that are "sustainable" is actually not the most favourable solution that I would go for if there was also a possibility to let other people such as environmental scientists and de-growth economists in. However I have mentioned the groups for the sake of the argument. I want to make clear that the institution should be lead by people who know that equally dividing the amount of fish per year will keep the sea live and kicking! A critical note will be about the possibility of having an objective institution that only thinks in order to keep a vivid sea, instead of moving towards fulfilling their own private goals - this is something to think about in another blog entry.

Second additional rule.

I think that the second additional rule should be that all the groups need to structurally meet once in a month to have a evaluative and educative session. The institution that is formed in the first rule, may be a good platform to share knowledge and show how it is possible to keep the sea alive!

By adding this possibility, the gap of lacking knowledge can be filled. The assumption is that knowing better will change the actions of the actors. This can be seen as setting a boundary condition.

Third additional rule. 

A third additional rule will be that annual contribution will be added to the system. Which in reality means that each boat has to contribute monetary value to the 'new institution' which then financially endow the boats that act according to the rules that are made. So in short: the boats that keep the sea vivid will get a financial subsidies which is actually a part of the overall contribution. This will be a way of extrinsically motivating boats to act sustainable.


How does this practically workout for the game?

In my opinion, the boats go to 'artificial' customs, that is actually the institution that is defined above. The institution knows the amount of fish in the sea and the amount that should be harvested. The amount of 4! By additional rule 1 & 3, the boats are checked at the end of the harvesting.

The second rule is more a long-term argument. It can workout practically by an evaluation session at the end of each round. Where education and evaluation are combined.

I

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SA